Bucs Film Room: 1st Half Drives vs. SEA

Bucs offensive coordinator Byron Leftwich has taken a considerable amount of (deserved) criticism this year. The Bucs offense ranks 27th in the league in points per game (18.3). And it is easy to assume that this difference in effectiveness is due to changes in personnel. Afterall, the Bucs have basically turned over their interior offensive line, as well as their secondary pass-catching options. But the struggles are more systemic than that. And they go far beyond this year.

As with most offenses in the NFL, there is a considerable disparity between how effective the Bucs running and passing games are. Using epa/play you can see headed into the week 10 matchup the average run creates -0.266, while the average pass creates 0.06 epa/play. That’s about 1/3 of a point difference per play! If you aren’t a fan of epa there is a more traditional measure we can use as a proxy. This year Bucs running backs are averaging just 3.47 yards per carry.

Meanwhile, Bucs quarterback Tom Brady is averaging 6.6 yards per attempt. Now I am not advocating for the Bucs to pass on every down. Brady’s arm most likely can’t handle that load, there is a point where there would be diminishing returns, etc. But as I often say, there is a way for the Bucs to put themselves in a more advantageous position through play sequencing.

It is through that lens that I thought it might be fun to look back at the Bucs offensive performance against the Seahawks to see what was called, and whether it was best option at the time (trying to parse out as much hindsight as possible). This is one man’s opinion so feel free to come at me in the comments!

Drive One: Three And Out

Bucs start off with a banger! Leftwich begins the series by calling the first (of many!) runs. From a heavy 12 personnel package (Ko Kieft and Josh Wells lining up as tight ends to the left), the Bucs motion Chris Godwin from left to right and then just behind right tackle Tristan Wirfs. Everything about this screams run. The Seahawks bring eight in the box because they believe it as well.

And you know what the Bucs did? They ran. The Bucs went with a counter to the left. Kieft loses his block to Bruce Irvin (who had himself a day as a run defender) and running back Rachaad White is taken down for no gain. From an execution point, this could have been a huge gain if Kieft secures his block because there is a huge hole that develops just to the outside of left guard Nick Leverett as left tackle Donovan Smith climbs to the second level.

Regardless of the result I am not a fan of the play call. Leftwich did everything in his power short of taking out a billboard on the Autobahn to advertise the run and then went with it. Godwin motion behind the end lineman is a run tell. Wells in as an extra blocker with Kieft is a run tell. And when you are faced with needing five yards for a play to be considered a success (on first down a “successful” play should pick up half the yardage needed to convert a first down or touchdown), this set up ain’t it.

That put Tampa Bay into a 2nd and 10 where now they were forced to throw. Leftwich called a solid play out of a 3×1 that allowed Mike Evans to clear the short middle by running a seam route from the slot. This allowed Godwin to cut underneath and get open for a brief moment before linebacker Jordyn Brooks closes. Brady throws the ball to Godwin’s backside and low to prevent Brooks from having any chance at it and Godwin can’t make the catch.

On third down the Bucs came out in a 3×1 look from shotgun. A fun wrinkle they ran a good bit in this game was putting Evans and Godwin together on the concept side. This was often with both of them working inside a third receiver. On the boundary side Tampa Bay would use Julio Jones. Post-snap the Seahawks shaded the boundary safety to the concept side in an effort to get five on three. This left Jones one-on-one moving vertically on Seahawks corner Tariq Woolen. Jones gets a step on the rookie, but Brady overthrows him. On the concept side the Bucs had Godwin running an out against Brooks. The play-call was a solid one for the situation, but anything in that spot is low probability.

Drive Two: Field Goal (Range)

Bucs start off the drive with a play-action pass where Brady finds Evans on a crosser with a tight window pass for 29 yards. I love the play-call as Brady and the Bucs are one of the best play-action teams in the league and immediately gets Tampa Bay into field goal range. From there they go with a shotgun run on 1st and 10 from the SEA 30. The Bucs picked up eight, but for a penalty on Nick Leverett brought the ball back to the SEA 38. Don’t love the idea of another first down run, but if they are going to do it, I like the idea of doing it out of 11 personnel in shotgun–so call it a push.

Now faced with 1st and 18, Leftwich calls a second consecutive shotgun run. Nope. I’m out. I don’t care how off-guard you catch the defense, to expect nine yards (the definition of a “successful” play in this particular situation) is far-fetched to say the least. Fournette gets just three yards to set up 2nd and 15. At that point it seems like the Bucs played for more favorable field position to set up a higher percentage field goal, which makes sense in that situation. Kicker Ryan Succop ends up missing the 51-yard attempt.

Drive Three: POINTZZZ!

#Establishtherun continues to begin the Bucs third drive. Much like the opening drive, Tampa Bay decides to go with an under-center run from a heavy package (this time heavy 13, with Wells eligible as the third tight end). I think at this point you know I am not going to be advocating on the side of Leftwich’s genius for a call like this. He immediately puts his offense behind the eight-ball with as they pick up just three yards.

Faced with 2nd and 7 the Bucs double-down on the run calls. This time the run comes from shotgun in 11 personnel. Paul Atwal has discussed in great detail that the best offensive minds try to counter their tendencies. Well, the Bucs tendency over the Leftwich era on 2nd and long has been to throw to the tune of over 80%. Now I want to be clear, for all of the griping I and others do about Leftwich’s predilection to run too much on first down, this is great process! The last thing to consider here is that Seattle to this point had been almost exclusively two-high looks keeping the box light. And on the previous drive the Bucs threw on 2nd and long.

Given all of that the Bucs go to a shotgun run out of 11 personnel. Now, here is where I am going to differ from many people I respect. I kind of like this as a one-game changeup. I have already advocated for more shotgun runs. And this specific strategy counters a known tendency, so I am #TeamLeftwich on this decision.

With a new set of downs, the Bucs run on five of the next seven plays. The two pass calls came on 2nd and 6 and 1st and 10. The 2nd and 6 was a play-action designed touch for Godwin in-motion that picks up five. Simple but effective design. The 1st and 10 was another play-action call that sent Jones and Evans on deep vertical routes. The Seahawks cover these well and Brady is forced to dump off to tight end Cade Otton for a minimal gain. Despite the reduced result I like the play call.

Following the Otton catch and faced with 2nd and eight, Leftwich dials up another shotgun run. Having Fournette run behind a pulling Shaq Mason with a head of steam and not having him read out the blocks and make a choice played into the best of Fournette’s current game. As I said before, as a one game change-up I like the strategy.

Following a successful third-down conversion, the Bucs ran yet again on 1st and 10. And once again the result was as expected (just. one. yard.). But that set up perhaps my personal favorite play-call of the day. Last week I detailed another tendency Leftwich has developed over the course of this season. Namely, that on 2nd and medium-to-long he can get screen-happy. The Rams picked (hey look, a pun!) up on it the week prior and it nearly cost the Bucs the game. Leftwich thought Seattle might be looking for it and built in the long sought-after counter in the form of a fake screen fade to Evans.

I love this play call, and this can truly be an example of Byron being in his bag. I don’t think he needed to wait ten weeks and a near pick to finally pull this out, but I am glad to see him utilizing a tendency-breaker like this.

The next play was a first-down, play-action pass. The run-fake drew in the linebackers and Otton released freely over-the-middle on a crosser. It didn’t produce that result due to a fantastic play on the ball by Brooks to deflect the pass. On 2nd and 10, Leftwich called an under-center run for no-gain. I’ve said I like the one-game change to this so I will say I can live with this one, but I don’t love it entirely. This run came from under center instead of shotgun, and from a tight split instead of a more spread-out set.

Faced with 3rd and 10 from the Seattle 31 the Bucs ran three vertical routes from the field side of a 3×1 look while dragging Jones from the boundary side. Brady found Jones streaking free underneath. Jones makes the catch and sprints into the endzone for six.

Over the course of this drive the Bucs had several cool play-calls from my vantage point. Over the course of the 13-play drive, I thought Leftwich and the offense called plus plays on nine to ten of the plays. Not bad.

Drive Four: Two In A Row!

Following the defense’s third consecutive stop the Bucs offense took the field with the opportunity to go up by two scores. They started with a pistol run by Fournette for four yards. This was the 10th first-down play the Bucs had run and the pass-run ratio was now 7-3 in favor of the ground game. This is not the most efficient process, and I am against the play-call.

That run was followed by a pass call that found Evans one-on-one with Woolen on a quick hitch. Evans secured the catch and fell as he turned to push up field. The play was a good call with decent execution/ Evans failed to convert the first down simply because he was done in by the subpar field conditions. On the following play the Bucs went with a shotgun pass that allowed Evans to make a short, contested catch. I’m not opposed to that call, but I do want to note in a world where it seems like myself and others are anti-run, this is exactly the situation where I am all for a run-call.

Over the course of the next seven plays there were three first downs. All of them were called runs. They netted seven yards. This is why I have been critical of Leftwich this year. These runs are consistently putting the offense in bad situations where they have to be near perfect on third down in order to sustain drives.

The 10th play of the drive featured the high-end execution that Tampa Bay was delivering on Sunday. Scotty Miller ends up making a difficult catch in tight coverage on a fun whip route while Brady delivers a tight-window throw from the opposite hash after getting to a late read in a full-field progression with a pass rusher right in his grill.

The next two plays were back-to-back first-down play-action passes that netted 41 yards! That brought the Tampa Bay offense down to the Seattle 5-yard line. The Bucs closed out the drive with two straight Fournette runs that eventually punched the ball into the end zone. Out of 14 plays on this drive, I agreed with 10 of the calls Leftwich made. There was a total of seven first-down plays on the drive. One was just five yards out of the end zone, and it was reasonable to call a run that could be expected to gain at least 2.5 yards. Of the six others I would have been okay with one to two runs versus four to five passes. The Bucs ran the exact opposite.

Drive Five: Backed Up With Little Time

With just under three minutes left in the half the Bucs got the ball again at their own four-yard line. They opted for a conservative approach, running the ball from on first and second down from run-heavy looks. They generated three yards to give themselves some breathing room and attempted a third down pass to set them into their two-minute offense.

The play was out of an empty set with Otton running an out just underneath a dig from Godwin from three and two respectively to the field side. The play design got Otton open, but the play failed due to pressure on Brady from a failed communication between center Robert Hainsey and left guard Nick Leverett.

Given the field position I agree with the strategy here.

Drive Six: Kneel It Out

With 28 seconds left in the half and backed up on their own two, the Bucs elected to kneel out and enter halftime with the lead.

Six drives. 14 points. The Bucs were able to move the ball. During that period of time the Bucs ran 41 plays. Of those 41 I thought they had good play calls on 29 of them. This may seem like a pretty good ratio, but in my opinion, they are effectively giving a way one third of their play-calls and reducing their margin of error on the subsequent plays. For the first half of the Seattle game, they Bucs execution made up for all of those ineffective first down runs.